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Abstract
What do we think about when we mind wander and where do these thoughts come from? We tested the idea
that semantically rich stimuli yield patterns of mind wandering that are closely coupled with the stimuli compared
to being more internally triggered. We analyzed the content of 949 self-reported zone outs (1218 thoughts) and
519 of their triggers from 88 participants who read an instructional text and watched a film for 20 min each. We
found that mind wandering associated with memory retrieval was more frequent than prospection and introspection
across both stimuli. Over 70% of autobiographical and semantic memory retrievals were triggered by the content of
the stimuli, compared to around 30% for prospective and introspective thoughts. Further, latent semantic analysis
revealed that semantic and unspecific memories were more “semantically” similar to their triggers than prospective
and introspective thoughts, suggesting that they arise from spontaneous associations with the stimulus. These findings
suggest a re-evaluation of how internal concerns and the external world give rise to mind wandering and emphasize
the importance of studying mind wandering in semantically rich contexts akin to much of the real world.
Keywords: Mind wandering, Attention, Memory, Comprehension
Significance
Mind wandering frequently occurs during everyday activities
such as reading a book or watching TV, but where do these
thoughts come from and are they influenced by the ongoing
activity? We analyzed the content of thoughts, their triggers,
and thought trains during reading and film comprehension.
We found that: (1) mind wandering associated with memory
retrieval is highly common when processing semantically
rich content; and (2) much of spontaneous thinking is driven
by the stimulus itself. We propose that research should con-
sider semantic information in the environment to better
understand how internal concerns and the external world
give rise to mind wandering.
Background
When reading a text, listening to a conversation, or
watching a film, some of our thoughts are focused on
the content of the task at hand whereas others wander
off towards past memories, introspections, prospections,
and even fantasies. Experience sampling studies tell us
that mind wandering is ubiquitous, occurring as much
as 50% of the time in everyday life (Killingsworth &
Gilbert, 2010). Although numerous studies have focused
on analyzing the frequency of mind wandering across
tasks and contexts (see Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014
for an overview), few have explored from where it arises
and how it influences subsequent thinking. In fact, a re-
cent review of mind wandering research identified
“[characterizing] the environmental conditions and in-
ternal concerns that tend to initiate [it]” as a key issue
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015, p. 511). The emphasis on
internal states poses an important challenge because
much of psychological research focuses on establishing a
relationship between a stimulus or manipulation and be-
havior, somewhat neglecting that much of our thinking
is self-generated and often off-task. It is also possible
that the task or stimulus itself is the driver of mind wan-
dering, raising interesting questions about certain ex-
perimental effects (cf. Faber, Mills, Kopp, & D’Mello,
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2017; Krasich et al., 2018). Here, we analyze the content
of thoughts to provide insight into how task stimuli
drive mind wandering.
We begin by considering the nature of mind wandering.
The term itself captures one of its key characteristics:
“wandering” meaning to “move hither and thither without
fixed course or certain aim” (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng,
& Andrews-Hanna, 2016, p. 719). Indeed, mind wandering
is less deliberate than goal-directed thinking, as its content
mostly arises outside of cognitive control (Christoff et al.,
2016). This is not to say that “undeliberate” thoughts are
completely unconstrained – some spontaneous thoughts,
such as rumination and obsessive thoughts, are strongly
driven and automatically constrained by their affective sa-
lience (Christoff et al., 2016).
Importantly, sensory salience can lead to strongly con-
strained spontaneous remindings, for example, seeing a
professor in a green tie and vest can automatically trig-
ger memories about a pre-school teacher playing tricks
on his or her students on St. Patrick’s Day (example
from Ball & Little, 2006 p. 1173). In line with this, one
study found that people mind wandered more about the
past than the present or future while completing a vigi-
lance task with emotionally valenced words (Plimpton,
Patel, & Kvavilashvili, 2015), suggesting that emotional
words trigger past memories. Similarly, another study
(unexpectedly) found that when reading a text on mem-
branes, people who had more experience with the topic
of a text (e.g. years of formal biology education) mind
wandered more about the past than about the future
(Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009). These findings
suggest the content of mind wandering might be to
some extent triggered by the stimulus, likely through ac-
tivations of memory traces (Faber & Mills, 2018).
Of course, it is unlikely that all mind wandering arises
from stimulus1 processing. People also frequently mind
wander in situations that are devoid of much sensory or
affective salience. Studies that have used semantically
impoverished tasks, such as the Sustained Attention to
Response (SART) task, have found a strong bias towards
prospective mind wandering (e.g. Baird, Smallwood, &
Schooler, 2011; McVay & Kane, 2013; Smallwood et al.,
2009; Stawarczyk, Cassol, & D’Argembeau, 2013a;
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau,
2011). According to the current concerns hypothesis
(Klinger, 1978, 1999), personally relevant information, such
as unfulfilled goals, is the source of much of spontaneous
cognition. Indeed, when participants are asked to
focus on their personal concerns or needs before en-
gaging in a task, rates of mind wandering increase
(Klinger, 2013; Kopp, D’Mello, & Mills, 2015a;
Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011; Rummel & Nied,
2017; Stawarczyk, Majerus, & D’Argembeau, 2013b;
Stawarczyk et al., 2011), suggesting that this type of
mind wandering might to a large extent be driven by
the importance of these current concerns rather than
spontaneous associations elicited by the environment.
This does not imply that prospective mind wandering
is solely driven by internal concerns because a seman-
tically rich environment might also provide cues that
align with an individual’s active goals or concerns, trigger-
ing prospective thoughts (Klinger, 2013; McDaniel, Einstein,
Guynn, & Breneiser, 2004; Stawarczyk et al., 2011).
Hence, to what extent is the content of mind wander-
ing associated or triggered by the task stimulus versus
more internally driven? We hypothesize that when
people engage in semantically rich task contexts that
give rise to spontaneous associations, such as reading or
watching a film, we expect to find a greater propensity
of mind wandering thoughts related to autobiographical
and semantic memory retrieval compared to thoughts
pertaining to more internally driven current concerns
and feelings. We further hypothesize that the source of
mind wandering varies systematically, such that autobio-
graphical and semantic memories should be triggered by
and align with the stimulus to a greater extent than pro-
spective and introspective thoughts. This would suggest
that the former are more likely to arise from stimulus
processing whereas the latter are driven primarily (but
not exclusively) by internal concerns of importance to
the individual.
We leverage code and count techniques as well as
computational linguistics approaches (latent semantic
analysis [LSA]; Landauer, Folt, & Laham, 1998) to test
these predictions when people engage in two real-world
semantically rich activities: reading a text and watching
a film. We asked 88 participants to report the verbatim
content of their thoughts and what, if anything, triggered
them whenever they caught themselves mind wandering
during these 20-min long tasks. We then categorized the
content of the reported thoughts using rubrics based on
previous mind wandering (see below), diary, and mental
time travel studies (e.g. Ball & Little, 2006; Berntsen &
Hall, 2004; D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van Der Linden,
2011; Hintzman, 2011; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004;
Mace, 2005; Miles & Berntsen, 2015; Schank, 1983;
Seilman & Larsen, 1989). We compared the proportion
of thoughts across categories, and for each category,
computed the proportion of thoughts that were trig-
gered by the stimulus, and importantly, whether the
thought content was meaningfully related to the trigger.
Our study builds on previous studies that have com-
pared the occurrence of task-related interferences and
task-unrelated thoughts (e.g. Baird et al., 2011; Sarason,
Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986; Smallwood,
Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003; Stawarczyk et al., 2011) and
those that have distinguished among thoughts pertaining
to sensory and emotional states, the self, current
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concerns, prospective memory, stimuli, environmental
distractions, and fantasies (e.g. Baumeister, Vohs, & Oet-
tingen, 2016; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012;
Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Smallwood et al.,
2016; Song & Wang, 2012). However, in most of these
studies, participants did not report their thoughts verba-
tim (with the exception of Baird et al., 2011), but either
rated them on a Likert-scale (e.g. using a 1–5 scale, to
what extent a thought was related to a plan) or selected
a thought category out of a number of options (e.g.
“school-related,” “yourself,” “text-related,” “fantasies,”
etc.; Krawietz et al., 2012), limiting an in-depth analysis
of the thought content like in the present work.
We also collected data on people’s verbatim thought
triggers and used LSA (Landauer et al., 1998) to test as-
sociations between the trigger and the subsequent mind
wandering thought. For instance, the trigger “all the talk
about water” from the text stimulus and the mind wan-
dering memory-based thought, “[a] beach nearby me at
home that I always go to,” are meaningfully related, be-
cause water and beach share associations like the sea
and swimming. In contrast, the relationship between the
prospective thought “what I am going to wear to class
tomorrow” and its trigger “the red balloon” is less appar-
ent, as clothes and balloons have less semantic overlap.
The goal of this study is to tease apart these relation-
ships to provide insight into how mind wandering
emerges in semantically rich tasks contexts.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 88 undergraduate students from a
medium-sized private U.S. university (N = 65) and a large
public U.S. university (N = 23) who participated for course
credit (69% female). Participants were on average 19 years
old; 63% were Caucasian/White, 22% African-American/
Black, 6% Hispanic, Latino, or of Mexican origin, 4%
Asian, 4% American Indian or Native Alaskan, and 1% re-
ported “other.” Because the primary goal of the study was
to collect verbatim thought content, and our previous
studies with similar stimuli used suggested that the num-
ber of self-caught mind wandering reports varied consid-
erably across participants (Faber, Radvansky, & D’Mello,
2018; Kopp et al., 2015a; Kopp, Mills, & D’Mello, 2015b),
we sought to collect as much data within the subject pool
schedule. As such, we did not conduct an a priori power
analysis.
Ethics, consent, and permissions
Before the study, participants read and signed an agree-
ment to participate and a (voluntary) data release form
permitting the use of their data for publication. They were
informed that they were free to withdraw at any time. All
materials, procedures, and forms were approved by the
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human
Subjects at both universities.
Materials
The text excerpt was taken from a book entitled Soap--
bubbles and the Forces which Mould Them (Boys, 1890),
which is an instructional text on a relatively unfamiliar
topic (surface tension). The text is rich in semantic con-
tent as it describes a series of experiments that the
reader has to visualize (e.g. “I have in my hand a com-
mon camel’s-hair brush. If you want to make the hairs
cling together and come to a point, you wet it, and then
you say the hairs cling together because the brush is
wet”) (Boys, 1890, p. 15). To resemble naturalistic com-
puterized reading, an average of 650 words were pre-
sented per screen resulting in ten screens of text.
Participants read at their own pace and read on average
6.1 screens in the allotted 20 min. For the film, we used
the first 20 min of the movie Le Ballon Rouge (‘The Red
Balloon’), a 32.5-min French film with English subtitles
about a young boy in Paris who finds a red balloon that
follows him wherever he goes (Lamorisse, 1956).
Procedure
All experimental procedures were delivered on a com-
puter. Participants were informed that the primary task
was to read/watch an excerpt from the book/film (order
counterbalanced) for 20 min each. They were instructed
to report mind wandering whenever they found them-
selves zoning out while completing the primary task.
Participants received the following instructions:
While you are [reading/ watching the film], you
may find yourself thinking about something other
than what you are [reading/watching]. This is
called “zoning out.” We are interested in what types
of things people think about during a task like this
(and during other kinds of tasks). In order to
examine this, if you catch yourself zoning out at
any time during reading, simply press the key
labeled “ZONE OUT” on the keyboard. Please
locate the “ZONE OUT” key now.
When you indicate that you are zoning out the
computer will ask you what you were just thinking
about. It is perfectly normal to think about things that
are not related to the task and to have different kinds
of thoughts during different kinds of tasks. Please try
your best to honestly assess your thoughts at the time
when we ask.
Whenever participants reported zoning out, they were
further instructed as follows:
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In the space below please tell us what you were
thinking about when you zoned out.
Was there something in the [text/video] that triggered
this thought?
If yes then please describe what it was and if no then
leave blank.
The task paused while participants were reporting
thoughts. Participants were informed that the reading
and film comprehension phases of the study would last
20 min each and that reporting the content of their
thoughts would not increase the amount of time in
the study. They were encouraged to be as complete
as possible when reporting their thoughts. After both
phases of the study, participants were interviewed by the
experimenter about whether the instructions were clear,
what triggered their thoughts during both phases and
whether they had any issues reporting thoughts.
Results
Number of thoughts and triggers
Participants reported a total of 949 instances of mind
wandering (557 during text comprehension, 392 while
watching the film; an average of 10.8 [SD = 6.08] per
participant). Whereas most instances (77.1%) contained
one mind wandering thought, 217 instances were asso-
ciated with two or more thoughts (e.g. “[When I was
Facetiming with my mom yesterday]THOUGHT1 [and]
[step team tryouts]THOUGHT2”), resulting in a total of
1215 thoughts. We identified 43 thoughts that were
explicitly aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of
the text or film as on-task thoughts and excluded
them (e.g. “The camel’s hair experiment performed in
the text,” “Whether the man in the window was the
one who wrote down something in the previous
scene,” “How capillary action in plants carry water up
the stem. I have an image in my head of water going
up the stem of a plant”).
We obtained participants’ responses for 1082 thought
triggers (we did not systematically obtain triggers for 136
thoughts from 10 participants due to experimental error).
A total of 524 (48.4%) thoughts were accompanied with a
trigger (302 in the text condition, 222 in the film condition).
Upon closer inspection, 46 triggers contained content asso-
ciated with the thought (e.g. “[The soap]TRIGGER [reminded
me that] [I need to give my dog a bath and make an
appointment for him to get his nails clipped]CONTENT”).
We separated the thought content from the trigger and
counted it as a thought unless it fully overlapped with the
reported thought. Eight triggers consisted of only thought
content (e.g. “Fortunate to live in the country and have
gone down to play by the brook”) and were therefore not
counted as triggers but instead as thoughts. For three
thoughts, no trigger was reported but the thought content
explicitly mentioned the trigger. In those cases, we removed
the trigger from the thought content and counted it as a
trigger (e.g. “[Reading the name “Lear”]TRIGGER [made me
think of] [King Lear]CONTENT”). This resulted in a total of
1218 thoughts (732 from the text condition, 486 from the
film condition; on average 13.8 mind wandering thoughts
(SD = 8.04) per participant) and 519 triggers (298 in the text
condition, 221 in the film condition). Out of these triggers,
only 24 (4.58%) were related to internal states of the partici-
pants (e.g. “I’m just really bored”). All other triggers were
related to the content of the stimuli.
Thoughts per category
Two researchers—one of whom was naïve about the
aims of the study— coded the following content categor-
ies: autobiographical memories; semantic memories;
fantasies; prospection (including current concerns);
task-related interferences; thoughts about the stimulus
itself; environmental distractions; and introspection
(see Appendix and Table 1 for the full rubric along
with examples). When it was unclear whether a mem-
ory was semantic or autobiographical, it was catego-
rized as an unspecific memory. Thoughts that did not
clearly fit in a category were categorized as vague. The
coders first coded 100 randomly selected thoughts and
discussed their categorizations until they reached full
agreement. They then independently coded the remaining
instances, achieving fair agreement (Cohen’s κ = 0.71).
Finally, the coders resolved all disagreements through
discussion.
Table 1 gives an overview of percentages and number of
thoughts per category. We used Wilcoxon’s signed rank test
for paired samples at the participant level (non-parametric
testing due to zero-inflated distributions and overdisper-
sion; Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons;
Table 2) to establish whether some categories were more
frequent than others. Introspection, prospection, autobio-
graphical and semantic memories, and thoughts about the
stimulus and task occurred more frequently than fantasies
and environmental distractions. Prospection and introspec-
tion were more frequent than task-related interferences,
but not autobiographical and semantic memories. When
we combined autobiographical, semantic, and unspecific
memories into one memory category, we found that mem-
ories (M = 4.58, SD = 4.18) were significantly more frequent
than prospection (Z = 4.22, p < 0.001) and introspection (Z
= 4.10, p < 0.001). This suggests that the prospective bias
observed in previous studies (e.g. Baird et al., 2011; McVay
& Kane, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2009) might be limited to
contexts relatively devoid of semantic content.
We conducted two follow-up analyses. First, we used
thought-level mixed-effects logistic regressions to explore
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whether thoughts from each category (coded as 1 or 0)
were more likely to occur when participants (added as
a random intercept) completed the text or film com-
prehension task first. These analyses yielded no signifi-
cant differences (all p values > 0.287). We therefore did
not distinguish between the different orders in the
subsequent analyses.
We also used thought-level mixed-effects logistic regres-
sions to investigate whether thoughts from certain categor-
ies were more likely to occur during the text or film
comprehension task (fixed effect) with participant as an
intercept-only random effect. We found one significant
difference (all other p values > 0.168) – thoughts about
the stimulus were more likely during film comprehension
Table 1 Thought categories, frequencies, and examples
Percent N Examples
Environmental distractions 2.79 34 “It is warm in this room,” “What are those red things in the monitor
of the computer,” “A high pitch tone outside.”
Task-related interferences 8.21 100 “If the experimenters chose this text because it is very boring and
they want us to zone out a lot,” “If I am going to be quizzed on
this,” “I was wondering how much time was left.”
Stimulus 10.3 126 “I was thinking that the red balloon had to have been CGI or
something,” “Is this really a book,” “How cute the little boy is.”
Semantic memories 13.7 167 “I thought about a scene from both “The Mummy” and “The
Return of the Mummy”,” “A story about someone injuring their
eyes when diving in with them open,” “Trying to remember
which Millais painting had a bubble in it.”
Autobiographical memories 14.7 179 “I remember walking in lines like that in grade school,” “When
I visited the Louvre and saw the Greek and Etruscan vases,”
“Jumping into the lake last Saturday morning.”
Unspecific memories 4.68 57 “Friends potentially in a class together,” “My roommate playing
in the marching band,” “My new swimsuit.”
Fantasies 3.12 38 “Imagining my friend asking me “so chem[istry] is your easiest class
right?”,” “What would happen if there were some sort of emergency
while I were taking this study,” “What if everyone all the time spoke
out their thoughts out loud like I am typing right now. What would
happen.”
Prospection 16.8 204 “Cheer practice tonight,” “School work that I have to complete,”
“I need to activate my card.”
Introspection 16.9 206 “I am about to fall asleep,” “How much I hate math,” “I cannot
believe how many random thoughts I have.”
Vague 8.78 107 “Sleeping,” “Water,” “Nothing in particular.”
Percentages represent percentage of all thoughts (total number of thoughts is 1218)
Table 2 Pairwise-comparisons between the frequencies of thought categories across participants using Wilcoxon’s signed rank test
for paired samples
Effect size r = Z√ðnxþny Þ of the difference









Introspection 2.34 (2.86) 0.062 0.056 0.069 0.193 0.284* 0.403* 0.484* 0.474*
Prospection 2.32 (2.25) 0.072 0.093 0.201 0.284* 0.430* 0.491* 0.469*
Autobiographical memory 2.03 (2.41) 0.029 0.111 0.226 0.355* 0.446* 0.385*
Semantic memory 1.90 (2.44) 0.107 0.178 0.331* 0.396* 0.372*
Stimulus 1.43 (1.95) 0.107 0.235 0.341* 0.334*
Task-related interferences 1.14 (1.98) 0.139 0.267* 0.274*
Unspecified memory 0.65 (0.92) 0.153 0.124
Fantasies 0.43 (0.89) 0.004
Environment 0.39 (0.79)
Rows and columns are ordered by mean (greatest to smallest; top-bottom and left-right). * represents statistical significance at α = 0.001 (Bonferroni correction for
36 comparisons)
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(e.g. “Whether the balloon is real or picture animated,”
“I wish this balloon made sound or something”) (odds
ratio [OR] = 13.5, SE = 2.57, p = 0.006), which is unsur-
prising due to the comparatively stronger audiovisual
information in the film compared to reading text (Fig. 1).
Triggers per category
Where do mind wandering thoughts come from? It is
clear that thoughts about external distractors, the task,
and stimuli are cued by the environment. But what about
thinking of “a cat I had that used to follow me around
everywhere” or “what if the kitty of Alice in Wonderland
is actually who is leading the balloon?” In particular, we
asked whether memories were more likely to be triggered
by the stimulus compared to introspective and prospective
thoughts that are considered to arise primarily from feel-
ings and current concerns, respectively. We used
thought-level mixed-effect logistic regressions to predict
whether a thought was triggered (1) or not (0) from the
thought category, using participant as a random intercept.
To test whether patterns were the same across reading
and film comprehension, we added task as an interaction
term. This led to convergence issues, so we repeated the
analysis for each task separately. In a preliminary analysis,
we ascertained that order (text or film comprehension
first) did not affect the likelihood of a thought being trig-
gered (OR = 0.867, SE = 1.37, p = 0.652), so we did not dis-
tinguish between orders here.
We found that the likelihood of a thought being trig-
gered differed across thought categories (main effects:
Wald χ2 (9) = 90.2, p < 0.001 for text comprehension,
Wald χ2 (4) = 47.9, p < 0.001 for film comprehension)
(Fig. 2). Planned comparisons (estimated marginal means;
Lenth, 2018) indicated that semantic memories were
indeed more likely to be triggered than prospection (text/
film: OR = 15.4/18.3, SE = 6.34/11.7, both p < 0.001) and
introspection (text/film: OR = 13.6/14.6, SE = 5.64/8.92,
both p < 0.001). We found the same pattern for autobio-
graphical memories (text/film: OR = 8.85/12.3, SE = 3.31/
7.67, both p < 0.001 for introspection; OR = 7.83/9.82, SE
= 3.00/6.12, both p < 0.001 for prospection). Unspecific
memories followed a similar pattern, but differences were
only significant for the text condition, likely because there
were only 11 unspecific memories for the film condition
(text/film: OR = 5.38/5.93, SE = 2.61/6.07, p < 0.001/p =
0.082 for introspection; OR = 4.76/4.73, SE = 2.33/4.66,
p = 0.002/ p = 0.115 for prospection). In separate ana-
lyses for each thought category, we ascertained that
the likelihood of a thought being triggered did not
vary as a function of task for any of these categories
(all p values > 0.360). Together, these findings suggest
that memories might arise from processing semantically
rich information, whereas prospection and introspection
might primarily (albeit not exclusively) be driven more by
internal factors.
Relationship between thoughts and triggers
We then asked how thought content is related to the
reported triggers. We hypothesized that the relation-
ship between thoughts and triggers should be stron-
ger for thoughts associated with memory retrieval
compared to thoughts that primarily arise from
current concerns, such as prospection or introspec-
tion. We used an open source implementation (Olney,
2009) of LSA (Landauer et al., 1998) – a computa-
tional technique to measure the semantic similarity
between two texts based on a reference semantic
space – to obtain a measure of semantic overlap
Fig. 1 Proportions of thoughts per category per task pooled across thoughts (light gray: film comprehension, dark gray: text comprehension)
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between each thought and its trigger. We used the
Touchstone Applied Science Associates (TASA) cor-
pus (with 300 dimensions with log entropy weighting)
for the semantic space. We then used linear
mixed-effects regression to test whether semantic
overlap differed across content categories and tasks,
controlling for the number of words in the thoughts
and triggers. Participant identity was added to the
model as a random intercept. We excluded thoughts
pertaining to environmental distractors as there were
insufficient instances for modeling (N = 2). In a separ-
ate analysis, we found that task order did not affect
semantic overlap (Wald χ2 (1) = 0.008, p = 0.930) and
was therefore not included in these analyses.
Semantic overlap between thoughts and triggers varied
marginally across content categories (Wald χ2 (8) = 15.0,
p = 0.059) and significantly across tasks (Wald χ2(1) =
4.20, p = 0.040) (Fig. 3). Overlap was on average higher
for thoughts reported while watching the film (M =
0.225, SD = 0.203) than during text comprehension (M =
0.172, SD = 0.185). There was no interaction between
task and content (Wald χ2 (8) = 10.3, p = 0.243). Planned
comparisons between the memory-related categories,
prospection, and introspection revealed that semantic
memories were more similar to their triggers than pro-
spective thoughts (b = 0.079, SE = 0.032, p = 0.014) and
introspection (b = 0.069, SE = 0.031, p = 0.024). Unspe-
cific memories displayed a similar pattern (b = 0.123, SE
Fig. 3 Average LSA score for the relationship between the thoughts and triggers (dark gray) and thoughts and random triggers (light gray) at the
thought-trigger level
Fig. 2 Proportion of triggered thoughts per category
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= 0.047, p = 0.010 compared to prospection and b =
0.113, SE = 0.046, p = 0.014 compared to introspection).
Autobiographical memories did not differ significantly
from either category (b = 0.039, SE = 0.032, p = 0.232 for
prospection and b = 0.029, SE = 0.031, p = 0.353 for
introspection). As an additional check, we confirmed
that thoughts about the stimulus displayed a strong
relationship with their triggers compared to thoughts
about prospection and introspection (b = 0.084, SE = 0.036,
p = 0.022 for prospection and b = 0.074, SE = 0.034,
p = 0.031 for introspection).
If the content of thoughts is driven and constrained by
the stimulus that triggered them, then breaking those
links should lead to significantly weaker relationships.
To test this hypothesis, we randomly shuffled the
thoughts within each participant’s reports for a category
to obtain a measure of overlap between a trigger and a
randomly shuffled thought from the same category while
accounting for the individual’s “thought space” (thoughts
in that category for a given participant). Participants
who only reported one trigger–thought pair for a cat-
egory were excluded from the analysis for that category
shuffling was not feasible. We tested whether LSA over-
lap differed significantly between the actual and the
shuffled thoughts using the linear mixed-effects model-
ing approach above. We found that, as expected, the
relationship between thoughts and shuffled triggers
was significantly weaker for semantic, autobiograph-
ical, and unspecific memories (Wald χ2 (1) = 19.7, p <
0.001, Wald χ2 (1) = 5.92, p = 0.015, and Wald χ2 (1) =
5.91, p = 0.015, respectively) and for thoughts about
the stimulus (Wald χ2 (1) = 29.4, p < 0.001) but not
for introspection (Wald χ2 (1) = 1.07, p = 0.301), and
prospection (Wald χ2 (1) = 0.311, p = 0.577). Thus, the
results suggest that the relationship between thoughts
and their triggers is meaningful for memory-related
thoughts compared to introspective and prospective
thoughts.
Train of thoughts
If thoughts are driven by associations, then the content of
one thought might trigger another (i.e. the experience of a
train of thought) within the same mind wandering episode.
For example, consider the following thought train from a
participant: “beach nearby me at home that I always go
to”→ “my job as a beach tagger during high school”→ “a
guy that I used to like.” Or: “LouvreTRIGGER”→ “the
Louvre”→ “haha last time I was in the Louvre I threw up
in front of the Mona Lisa” → “I wonder how strange the
people looking at this data will think I am” → “Maybe I
should have admitted this after all.”
In our sample, 217 thoughts were followed by (at least)
a second thought. For these instances, we computed the
LSA score between the first and second thought; there
were insufficient data to go to the third thought and be-
yond. We compared these scores to random surrogates
obtained by pairing the same first thought with a second
thought from a randomly selected episode from the
same participant (e.g. the thought “beach nearby me at
home that I always go to” would be paired with “my
friend’s parents being here last weekend”). Participants
who only reported one mind wandering episode were
excluded from the analysis as thought pairs could not
be shuffled. Using the linear mixed-effects modeling
approach above (ignoring content category due to
sample size), we found that the relationship between
consecutive thoughts (M = 0.422, SD = 0.255) was
stronger than between shuffled thoughts (M = 0.367,
SD = 0.244); (Wald χ2 (1) = 4.89, p = 0.027). There was
no significant interaction with task (p = 0.513), suggest-
ing that the relationship between consecutive thoughts
was stronger than between random thoughts for both
reading and film comprehension. These findings sug-
gest that the content of one thought can trigger an-
other related thought to produce semantically related
thought trains.
Discussion
Our aim was to test the idea that the task stimulus itself
might trigger certain types of mind wandering. We
found that during real-world, semantically rich, reading
and film comprehension tasks, memories (pooled across
autobiographical, semantic, and unspecific memories)
were almost twice as frequent as prospective (and also
introspective) thoughts. Furthermore, approximately half
of the mind wandering thoughts were triggered from the
stimulus, a conservative estimate which relies on partici-
pants recalling the trigger (see below). Thoughts pertain-
ing to memories were more likely to be triggered from
the stimulus than prospective and introspective
thoughts. Importantly the content of the semantic and
unspecific memories was more strongly semantically re-
lated to their reported triggers than prospective and
introspective thoughts, suggesting that the stimulus can
drive and constrain the content of mind wandering that
arises from memory associations.
The pattern of thought content observed here differs
from many laboratory studies that have found that mind
wandering thoughts tend to be focused on the future
(e.g. Baird et al., 2011; McVay & Kane, 2013; Smallwood
et al., 2009). The high prevalence of memories across
both tasks, combined with the fact that we found no
differences in the frequencies of prospective and
memory-related thoughts across tasks, supports the idea
that the content of mind wandering varies as a function
of whether a task requires processing semantically rich
information. Thus, the prospective bias observed in task
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contexts that are relatively devoid of semantic content
might not generalize to real-world semantically rich
tasks like those studied here, but would apply to other
real-world tasks, such as vigilance tasks (Giambra,
1993).
Our findings also differ from experience sampling
studies (e.g. asking people to report their thoughts
throughout the day) which have suggested that much
of mind wandering is future related (Song & Wang,
2012; Spronken, Holland, Figner, & Dijksterhuis, 2016).
However, the relatively uncontrolled nature of these
studies makes it difficult to investigate the relationship
between what a person is doing and thinking as the
data lack contextual detail and temporal precision. Based
on our study, we would predict that mind wandering
thoughts would more likely consist of memory-based
retrievals when people engage in semantically richer
activities like reading the newspaper or watching tele-
vision, whereas prospection would be more frequent
during more repetitive task like doing the dishes or
vacuuming.
We do not claim that prospection is by definition
stimulus-unrelated as around 30% of prospective
thoughts were triggered by the stimulus content. This
finding aligns with previous studies that have shown that
cueing a person’s current concerns, for instance by
asking them to make a to-do list (Kopp et al., 2015a) or
read words that are related to the current concerns
(McVay & Kane, 2013) can increase mind wandering.
Examples from our data support this conclusion – we
observed that “the passage [..] continuously talking about
math” can trigger thoughts about “my math test at
11:20,” and seeing the letters “AB carved in the brick
wall” can lead to “thinking about plans for the weekend”
with a “friend [whose] initials are AB.” The current study
suggests that stimulus processing can give rise to pro-
spection if its content is related to the person’s concur-
rent goals. This also resonates with findings from the
prospective memory literature, which suggest that cues
that are related to a prospective memory (e.g. an unful-
filled task) may reflexively trigger spontaneous retrieval
of that task or goal (McDaniel et al., 2004; Scullin,
McDaniel, Shelton, & Lee, 2010).
A distinction based on whether a thought is directly trig-
gered by the stimulus somewhat overlaps with the distinc-
tion between “stimulus-independent and task-unrelated
thoughts” and “task-related interferences” (Frank, Nara,
Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015; Stawarczyk et al., 2011;
Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014). However, our findings
suggest that stimulus-dependence and task-relatedness are
distinct dimensions in semantically rich task contexts. In
particular, a task-unrelated thought (e.g. thinking about
homework while reading a text) can be stimulus-dependent
(e.g. triggered by the text) or stimulus-independent (e.g.
arising from salient internal concerns). Similarly, task-
related interferences can be more (e.g. wondering
how long the passage of text would be) or less (e.g.
wondering how many minutes have passed)
stimulus-dependent. Although it might seem counter-
intuitive, thoughts can also be stimulus-independent,
yet task-dependent. For example, reading a text on
cell biology can lead one to deliberate on a previously
studied genetics text – here the stimuli are different
but the thought space is conceptually connected and
such integration lies at the heart of deep learning
(McNamara, Oreilly, & Vega, 2012).
The finding that mind wandering is to some extent
driven by stimulus context prompts a definition that
captures this quality. As we have shown here, defining
mind wandering as “stimulus-unrelated thought”
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) misses an important
part of the phenomenon. Stimulus processing gives
rise to mind wandering through spontaneous associa-
tions, which are relatively constrained by the semantic
relationship with stimulus-based triggers. This is in
line with the idea that mind wandering is a type of
spontaneous thought that is relatively unconstrained
by cognitive control (although some mind wandering
might be intentional; see Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016),
but varies in how strongly it is constrained by sensory
(and affective) salience (Christoff et al., 2016).
We also observed that consecutive thoughts were
more strongly semantically related than random
thoughts sampled from an individual’s thought space,
suggesting that the content of one thought triggers and
constrains the next. It is also possible that another
source (e.g. a potentially unreported thought or trigger)
triggered both of them somewhat independently.
Thoughts might also become more loosely associated
over time, as one would expect during generation of
new mental content (e.g. creative thinking) (Mills,
Herrera-Bennett, Faber, & Christoff, 2018) but we could
not analyze thought trains beyond the second thought
due to a limited amount of data. Further research could
shed light on how trains of thought unfold, elucidating
the underlying principles of how the content of mind
wandering arises.
It is important to consider some caveats with the
present study. Because we focused on the self-caught
method of reporting, mind wandering instances that did
not reach meta-cognitive awareness might have been
missed (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). However, a bene-
fit is that reports can occur at any time, independent of
whether and when a participant received a thought
probe, which is the more common way to track mind
wandering (Giambra, 1995; Schooler et al., 2004). This is
important for the purpose of the present study as it
aims to elucidate the relationship between mind
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wandering and stimulus content without being limited to
specific probe locations. An open question pertains to
the systematic relationships between awareness of
mind wandering, its content, and associated triggers
and how the task context modulates these relation-
ships. Although these aspects are beyond the scope of
the present paper, establishing how internal and external
triggers interact and compete to influence mind wander-
ing and meta-cognitive awareness is an important step
towards understanding the dynamics of spontaneous
thought.
People also require awareness of the mind wander-
ing triggers. Previous work has suggested that people
might not actually be aware of how a stimulus influ-
ences their behavior but will still report a relationship
when asked (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), suggesting that
people might infer a relationship based on causal the-
ories or expectations. Therefore, it is possible that
some triggers were inferred rather than remembered.
That said, we aimed to avoid this by making report-
ing of the trigger voluntary. Specifically, we ask
participants whether there was “something in the
[text/video] that triggered this thought,” and explicitly
gave instruction for both options (“If yes then please
describe what it was and if no then leave blank”).
The fact that participants reported triggers for around
half of the thoughts suggests that they indeed did not
feel compelled to report a trigger for every thought.
Furthermore, the ~ 10% of the thought–trigger pairs
for which thoughts and triggers were (inadvertently)
reported together provide some insight into the valid-
ity of reported triggers. Examples suggest that these
thoughts are triggered by a specific aspect of the
stimuli, rather than post-hoc inference of the relation-
ship: “The word “good” reminded me of my philoso-
phy homework I haven’t finished,” “The boy was
headed somewhere with his briefcase and it reminded
me of what I have to do,” “I read the words “don’t
know” and it reminded me of Socrates basically saying
we don’t know wisdom, only God does.” Furthermore,
there is also the possibility that it might be easier to re-
member and therefore report semantically associated trig-
gers. These are known limits of verbal protocols and we
are unaware of any alternative to obtain the contents of
consciousness.
In addition, our self-caught approach ostensibly re-
quires participants to divide attention between the
primary task (reading text/watching film) and thought
monitoring. It is possible that due to the demanding
nature of the primary tasks, participants missed some
instances of mind wandering. It is also possible that
the extraneous load of simultaneous thought monitor-
ing influenced how deeply participants processed the
text or film. If processing was shallow, the frequency
of associations triggered by the stimulus might be
relatively low compared to when participants focus
only on reading or watching the film. It might also
be the case that constant thought monitoring resulted
in an on average earlier termination of trains of
thoughts. If the mind wanders further away from the
stimulus as the train of thoughts continues, then our
sample might be biased towards thoughts that are
more closely related to the stimulus. Further research
could shed light on these questions by exploring the
relationship between thought content and the stimu-
lus in a probe-caught or retrospective paradigm,
although each has its limitations with regard to sam-
pling frequency, probe placement, and the veracity of
memories.
Conclusions
In sum, our findings suggest that an analysis of mind
wandering in semantically rich task contexts should
account for multiple thought categories and associ-
ated triggers. Spontaneous associations that arise from
stimulus processing are expected due to the associa-
tive nature of memory. These associations can be
relevant to the task at hand and even enhance per-
formance on the primary task as in the case of infer-
ence generation and creative ideation. However, as
illustrated here, stimulus processing can also lead to
retrieval of content that is irrelevant to the current
task, such as memories, fantasies, and prospection.
Importantly, the semantic-richness of the task context
moderates (among other factors) the extent to which
the stimulus activates different mind wandering
thoughts. Semantically light environments should trig-
ger a relatively high proportion of thoughts that arise
from internal concerns, whereas semantically rich
environments should trigger more stimulus-driven
mind wandering. Whereas the present research has
shown a higher propensity towards memory associa-
tions compared to thoughts arising from current con-
cerns in semantically rich environments, further
research is needed to make a more direct comparison
between task contexts. We suggest that mind wander-
ing research should move towards a comprehensive
framework of when, why, and how the mind wanders
when people engage in real-world tasks with varying
degrees of semantic content.
Endnotes
1We distinguish between the content of the task at
hand (i.e. the stimulus) from the context in which it
occurs (i.e. the environment). For example, if the task
is to read a text in the lab, the stimulus is the text
and the environment is the lab, the desk, etc.
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Appendix
Mind wandering content coding rubric
Thoughts pertaining to the immediate environment
Environmental distractions
Thoughts pertaining to the immediate environment
decoupled from the task. This includes thoughts about:
 Time, e.g. “I wonder what time it is.”
 Temperature and weather, e.g. “It is warm in this
room,” “The weather is so gloomy.”
 Room, building, and items in it, e.g. “These eye
sensors blink a lot,” “The fact that there are no
windows in here.”
 External distractors, e.g. “Something making a faint
sound near the desk,” “I hear bagpipes.”
Task-related interferences
Thoughts related to the task itself (rather than to the
stimulus). This includes thoughts about:
 The experiment, e.g. “Why the experimenters would
choose this movie,” “What zoning out really is and
how I can tell if I’m doing it.”
 Progression of the experiment, e.g. “I was wondering
what the next part of the study is,” “I wondered how
much of the text I would have to read,” “Wondering
how much time is left.”
 Apparatus, e.g. “The eye tracking device,” “What
does this wrist band do.”
Stimulus
Thoughts related to the content or presentation of the
text/film, but not associations going beyond the content.
This includes thoughts about:
 The text/film content, e.g. “I wish this balloon made
sound or sound or something,” “The name Simple
Simon is ridiculous,” “The fakeness of the balloon,”
“Whether the balloon is real or picture animated.”
 The text/film presentation, e.g. “These sentences are
abnormally long,” “It is strange watching a video
with this aspect ratio.”
 Thoughts, reflections, and inferences related to the
immediate content of the film, e.g. “What is so
special about this red balloon,” “I hope his balloon
pops.”
Thoughts pertaining to memories
Semantic memory
General knowledge (including facts, meaning, and con-



















Fig. 4 Overview of mind wandering content coding rubric
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equations math problems,” “Uptown Girls movie where
the little girl gets a pet pig from her nanny,” “Song
lyrics.”
Autobiographical memory
These are thoughts about events that are (1) related to
the person themselves and (2) have actually happened,
e.g. “When I rode on a bus in Colorado,” “Painting as a
child.” They are anchored in time (and space). In some
cases, the “when” can be inferred (e.g. “My high school
bio class”).
Unspecific memory
Thoughts that require retrieval of information not im-
mediately relevant to prospection/current concerns, but
that do not meet the requirements for autobiographical
memory, e.g. “My dog,” “Thinking about my grandpa.”
Introspection
Thoughts related to meta-cognition or feelings or
thoughts regarding the self. This includes thoughts
about:
 Bodily feelings, e.g. “How tired I am,” “My knee
itches,” “I am sleepy,” “Getting really hungry.”
 Emotional states, e.g. “Kind of confused,”
“Frustrated,” “Worrying about my exams.”
 Mental states and reflections, e.g. “I miss my dog,”
“It’s been a long week.”
 Reflections on task performance, e.g. “I am thinking
about how difficult it is to focus on this page,” “I
read really slow[ly],” “How I need to focus on
reading,” “How much I zone out while studying,”
“I’m not absorbing anything.”
Prospection
Thoughts about the future, including current concerns.
This includes thoughts about:
 Future plans, e.g. “My plans for the weekend,”
“Assignments due tomorrow,” “Practice later,”
“Where I’m going for dinner.”
 Prospective memory, e.g. “I need to put gas in my
truck,” “Having to respond to a text telling work I
did the laundry today,” “I need to get my nails done.”
 Planning, e.g. “Goals for the future,” “If I’m going to
run and shower before [dinner] or wait until later
and just run on the treadmill,” “Trying to make a
plan of what I am going to do tonight.”
 Current concerns, e.g. “The word good reminded me
of my philosophy homework I have not finished.”
Fantasies
Fantasies and counterfactual situations, e.g. “What it
would be like if there were a fire drill right now,” “I was
imagining football players trying to stay on top of their
school work,” “What would have happened if I had
crossed the street and got hit. I would have had to tell
someone I had Medex.”
Vague
Thoughts that are none of the above. This includes
thoughts about:
 No content, e.g. “I just started thinking,” “Nothing in
particular,” “Do not remember.”
 Sleep, e.g. “Sleeping,” “A nap,” “Napping.”
 Unclear whether prospection or memory, or, e.g.
“Traveling to India,” “Going to work,” “Soccer
practice.”
 Unclear content, e.g. “Bese.”
 Too generic, e.g. “Lunch,” “Eating,” “Starbucks
Coffee.”
Not mind wandering
Thoughts that are immediately relevant to understanding
the text or film: e.g. “How capillary action in plants carry
water up the stem. I have an image in my head of water
going up the stem of a plant,” “Hydrogen bonds and the
chemical properties of water,” “Predicting a conclusion of
water’s cohesive properties,” “How this has nothing to do
with bubbles right now. Or maybe it does, but I can’t
make the connection,” “Is letting go of the balloon and
getting on the bus symbolic of growing? Of losing color in
adulthood?”, “Is this balloon supposed to be a metaphor
for something?”, “Trying to figure out the plot of this
movie.” This includes wondering what a word means (e.g.
“A water butt? I have never heard of that before,” “What’s
a tumbler?”, “What duckweed looks like”) or what is on
the screen (e.g. “I can’t tell what kind of animal that is”)
and reflections on what was on the screen (e.g. “Yay! He
got his balloon back!”, “Words!” [in response to the boy
speaking in the movie]), as this is on-task behavior.
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